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How did a highly educated scholar of law who was well-versed in European culture and politics 
view Estonia’s international relations and its geopolitical situation throughout the 1920s and early 
1930s? Examining István Csekey’s works provides an answer to this question, one which bears 
particular relevance to events occurring today.1 
 
 
Professor István Csekey (1889–1963) was a prominent figure in Hungarian 
and European law during the twentieth century. Other than his significant 
academic contributions, Csekey played a defining role in promoting relations 
between Hungary and the nations of Estonia as well as Finland during the 
interwar period. In Estonia, he furthered awareness of the Hungarian state and 
culture via academic, educational and journalistic means while familiarizing 
Hungarian audiences with Estonia through his works and lectures.2 Today, István 
Csekey’s efforts have been largely forgotten, a state that is undeserved given the 
important role this noteworthy scholar filled in expanding interwar, Hungarian 
society’s knowledge of Estonia. As the discipline of Finno-Ugric Studies seeks new 
alternatives in a world of dynamically fluctuating relations among the nations of 
Estonia, Finland and Hungary, it grows even more urgent for today’s scholars to 
reexamine what precedents were set and what eminent works were achieved by 
those who went before us. 
 
                                                          
1 This lecture was given at the Péter Domonkos Memorial Conference held on January 16, 2016 
and contains a section of a soon-to-be published examination of Professor István Csekey’s works 
on Estonian history. 
2 Bereczki, A. Eesti ja Soome rahvuspoliitika kajastumine Ungaris kahe maailmasõja vahelisel 
ajajärgul. – Akadeemia, 2005, 17, 2, 256–303. 
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THE  GEOPOLITICAL  SITUATION  AND  INTERNATIONAL  
RELATIONS 
 
From 1923 to 1931, István Csekey deepened his knowledge of Estonian 
culture and history as a guest professor lecturing at the University of Tartu, 
Estonia. He subsequently published his experiences stemming from these years in 
academic works and newspaper articles. From the very beginning of his arrival, 
Csekey devoted a great deal of time and energy to the geopolitical and national 
security issues inherent to Estonia’s standing. Beginning in 1923 and spanning  
a period nearly two decades in length, István Csekey regularly returned to these 
topics; true to his usual form, Csekey frequently did so by repeating his main 
conclusions, yet with the passing of time these observations underwent slight 
refinements and alterations. 
The following lines can be read at the beginning of many of Csekey’s 
lengthier historical overviews: “There is no doubt that Estonia completely owes 
its formation to the outcome of the world war. Even during the war, neither the 
boldest dreamers nor freedom’s fiercest advocates would have ever dared hope or 
consider that the Estonian people could come to inhabit their own independent 
and sovereign state. Unlike so many other nations, the Republic of Estonia was 
not created out of imperialist or expansionist aspirations, but rather emerged due 
to an unexpected turn of history’s ever-revolving wheel and in tandem with the 
ambitions of a people that preserves and consciously cherishes an enduring culture 
embedded in folk traditions.3 In short, Csekey points to the fact that Russia’s 
collapse enabled the emergence of Estonia and Finland as nations, a process 
that echoed throughout other parts of Europe as Germany, Romania and various 
Slavic countries were also established. With the appearance of Finland and 
Estonia, the map suddenly contained nations possessing a Finno-Ugric language 
and culture. Before this historical event occurred, among the Finno-Ugric peoples 
Hungary alone had been able to forge a stable state located in the Carpathian 
Basin. According to Csekey, fate had invested these peoples with the same task  
of “serving as a stalwart bastion in the defense of European culture from the East, 
which often released its threatening and crushing hordes.”4 
When outlining the region’s more concrete, geopolitical characteristics, Csekey 
describes Finland and Estonia as border states existing on Russia’s most northern 
edge, along the coast of the Baltic Sea. Due to its geographic location as well  
as its historic and cultural developments, the author classified Finland as a part  
of Scandinavia, while collectively grouping the Baltic states into a transitional 
                                                          
3 Csekey, I. Észtország története a világháború után. (Történelem a világháború után, 5.) Budapest, 
1931, 18; Csekey, I. Észtország állammá alakulásának története és államrendje. Klny. [Offprint] 
a Kecskeméten működő egyetemes ref. jogakadémia százéves fennállása alkalmából kiadott 
“Emlékkönyv”-ből. Hírlapkiadó és Nyomda, Kecskemét, 1932, 3.  
4 Csekey, I. Észtország története a világháború után, 18–19; Csekey, I. Észtország állammá 
alakulásának története és államrendje, 3. 
 101
territory that blocks Russia from the sea, yet also forms a kind of borderland of 
Central European culture due to the Protestant German influences found in its 
most northern reaches. In an earlier work, Csekey used the following words to 
expand upon this issue: “Its geographic location predestined the Baltics to act as 
the watershed for the East and West’s political, racial and economic estuaries.”5 
In his article dating from 1924, Csekey points to the presence of Finno-Ugric 
peoples already occupying Russia’s European territory at the beginning of the 
ninth century (with the exception of certain western areas). He also drew attention 
to the fact that the Baltics’ eastern boundary falls precisely along the borderland 
the Vikings (Varangians) traversed to reach the Sea of Azov from the Gulf of 
Finland. This area separated not only the Russians from Europe’s other peoples, 
but also divided Eastern Orthodoxy from Western Catholicism and the Cyrillic 
alphabet from the Latin alphabet. After Estonia became an independent country, 
the Narva (Narova) River and Lake Peipus once again divided East from  
West, thereby returning to the era when this territory was gradually conquered 
beginning in the early thirteenth century. At the end of the sixteenth century, this 
in essence marked the farthest reaches gained by the forces of the King of Poland, 
István Báthory. 
Following the so-called Great Northern War (1700–1721), which ended in 
victory for the Russian czar, Peter the Great, these eastern provinces bordering 
the sea remained a part of Russia for the next two hundred years. To use Csekey’s 
words, the Baltics acted as “Russia’s window,”6 through which it could peer toward 
Western Europe. Due to the way Germans had been “flocking” to the region 
for the past seven centuries, the Baltics also formed the Russian Empire’s 
most educated region. Throughout the centuries, Germans had come to control 
the region’s land holdings and trade while also directing its intellectual scene. 
During the last decades of czarism, German nobles from the Baltics practically 
took over the czar’s court, resulting in the spread of their retrograde ideas. 
According to Csekey, it was the combination of the chauvinism of the Baltic 
German nobility and the “nervous haste” of Germany’s general staff that came  
to ruin Germany’s relationship with the Baltics. “How differently the world 
war would have ended if the Germans had not attempted to annex the Baltics 
while simultaneously stoking the flames of Russian Bolshevism. If Germany had 
refrained from playing with the Red fire and kept a firm hand on Russia… the 
map of Europe would not be at all what it is today. Instead, German forces had to 
withdraw from the Baltics, where the extreme nature of their military rule had 
already earned the local population’s hatred. The Entente created Estonia, Latvia 
and Lithuania…”7 As Csekey viewed the situation, among these so-called border 
                                                          
5 Csekey, I. Az Észt Köztársaság alkotmánya és a Baltikum világpolitikai helyzete. – Magyar 
Kisebbség, 1926, 5, 4, 13–14. 
6 Csekey, I. A Baltikum és a szovjet. – Budapesti Hírlap, 20.12.1924; Csekey, I. Az Észt Köztársaság 
alkotmánya és a Baltikum világpolitikai helyzete, 14. 
7 Csekey, I. A Baltikum és a szovjet, 2; Csekey, I. Az Észt Köztársaság alkotmánya és a Baltikum 
világpolitikai helyzete, 14–15. 
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states Poland and Romania turned toward the Mediterranean and French 
dependence, while the Baltic states oriented themselves toward the Baltic Sea 
and therefore fell under British influence. In an earlier article, Csekey added that 
the Soviet Union’s attitude toward the Baltic states revolved around the Soviet 
Union’s relationship with Great Britain. In reference to the current situation, 
experts in political science would surely agree that the influence exerted by 




SWEDISH,  POLISH  AND  FINNISH  POLITICAL  AIMS 
 
In reference to the King of Sweden’s visit to Estonia in 1929, István Csekey 
stated that Estonia had – by virtue of coming under Sweden’s powerful influence – 
entered Northern Europe. This cultural impact mostly made itself felt in the areas 
of technical administration and education. It was during this Swedish period, for 
instance, that Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden established the University of Dorpat 
(Tartu) in 1632 as the sister institution to Uppsala University. 
When commenting on the official visit Estonia’s head of state, Jaan Tõnisson, 
made to Stockholm in 1928, Csekey emphasized that Estonia’s political leadership 
was attempting to draw closer to Sweden rather than looking eastward. Instead of 
opting for obvious shows of political influence, Sweden worked to bring Estonia – 
together with other nations that had once belonged to the former Swedish Empire – 
into its economic and cultural sphere of interest. In Csekey’s opinion, the future 
of this Swedish-dominated cultural commonwealth depended on its members’ – 
with particular emphasis on Estonia and Finland – ability to block the advance of 
Slavs and Bolshevism from the East. 
In February of the following year, Csekey followed the trip made by Estonia’s 
head of state to Warsaw for readers of the Budapesti Hírlap [‘Budapest News’].8 
He did not view the reinforcement of Estonian and Polish relations as a position 
that would be irreconcilable with Estonia’s gradually warming connection with 
Sweden. Other than the advantages posed by gaining Poland’s support as the 
largest military power in Eastern Europe, Csekey also weighed the possibility of 
establishing an anti-Bolshevist bloc stretching from the Mediterranean to the 
Bering Sea. More significantly, he believed that differences among the region’s 
nations could be solved. In his opinion, Europe was once again facing exactly  
the same question Báthory had upon realizing that Russia’s advance formed the 
greatest danger threatening Western culture. 
While living in Estonia, Professor Csekey also developed close ties with 
Finland. Since he also made roughly a dozen trips to this country, Csekey wrote 
numerous studies and newspaper articles about this other nation in the north.  
                                                          
8 Csekey, I. Az észt “államvén” Varsóban. – Budapesti Hírlap, 13.2.1930. 
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The concept of the “Estonian-Finnish bridge” – a symbol of cooperation between 
Estonia and Finland that emerged in the second half of the nineteenth century – 
inspired the text Csekey published in the journal, Magyar Külpolitika [‘Hungarian 
Foreign Affairs’].9 In this study, he observed that Finnish and Estonian politicians 
had only viewed the issue of cooperation as important while their nations were 
still living under Russian rule. In spite of what could be deemed in many ways 
as a common past, a related language and culture and similar geographic location, 
nothing was done to develop this joint line of defense against the East. To the 
contrary, relations between the two countries actually cooled to the point of 
frostiness. While Finland strove to join forces with Scandinavia’s foreign policy, 
at this point in time Estonia still believed in cooperating with the other nations 
bordering the Soviet Union. 
According to Csekey, Hungary10 would have welcomed the union between 
Estonia and Finland given their similar circumstances: both nations were small 
and impoverished while the cost of having a public administration was undeniably 
expensive. A country with a small population can obviously not compete with 
nations possessing much larger populations. As can be read in Csekey’s 1929 
article, he recommended that Estonia build a much closer relationship with 
Finland, whose economy was statistically better. In spite of their shared linguistic 
and cultural past, a joint state would not have to be immediately established, but 
rather a customs union would be the best option: each nation’s administration, 
parliament and government could operate independently of the other’s while 
maintaining joint direction of foreign policy, the military and finances. This Finnish-
Estonian union would represent a significant force while simultaneously cutting 
costs considerably.11 
When writing in the beginning of the 1930s about Estonia’s international 
relations, Csekey emphasized that – as a nation possessing a unique geopolitical 
location as a buffer state – it was in Estonia’s interest to remain in the best 
possible relations with its neighbours. Together with the other two Baltic states, 
Estonia’s leadership endeavored to establish an effective means of enforcing its 
interests at the League of Nations, but these attempts were never fully successful 
due to conflict between Poland and Lithuania. “Estonia’s geopolitical location, 
which acts as a connecting bond between East and West, demands a sense of 
cautious restraint in international politics. With time, however, this international 
necessity may form a firm base for Estonia’s future.”12 As we know, this latter 
statement was not to become reality. 
 
                                                          
9 Csekey, I. A finn-hid problémája. – Magyar Külpolitika, 1929, 10, 12, 11. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Csekey, I. Észtország története a világháború után, 41; Csekey, I. Észtország állammá alakulásának 
története és államrendje, 19. 
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ESTONIA’S  1924  COMMUNIST  PUTSCH  AND   
ESTONIAN-RUSSIAN  RELATIONS 
 
As was already demonstrated in the discussion of the previous topics, István 
Csekey could not exactly be called an admirer of Russia or communism. He 
viewed both as a threat to Western civilization and this opinion appeared in 
unvarnished form in his journalistic writings. As far as his aversion for and fear 
of the East is concerned, his feelings were most likely founded on his historical 
perspective, the public mood of the time and his analyses of national security. His 
misgivings surrounding Bolshevism were based on personal experience; in the 
spring of 1919, at the time of the Hungarian Soviet Republic, his own life came 
under threat when the “Reds” issued a warrant for his arrest. 
In his historical overview, the chapter he dedicated to analysing Estonian-
Russian relations and their future prospects was given the title of “A kommunista 
veszély” [‘The Communist Peril’]. Here, Csekey partly reused the thoughts he 
had expressed in his lecture given at the Magyar Külügyi Társaság [Hungarian 
Society of Foreign Affairs] in 1926, but also borrowed from two newspaper 
articles that had been published in Hungary a few days following the communist 
putsch, in the beginning of December, 1924. The chapter begins with the 
following sentence: “Estonia’s geopolitical situation bears within itself the peril of 
communism, for the country shares two hundred-seventy-seven kilometers of 
border with Soviet Russia. This is further compounded by the circumstance that 
this small, young republic beat the Soviets on open ground, causing the leaders of 
Estonia’s communist movement to flee to the neighboring territory. From there 
they were able to continue their underground work via secret channels. Among 
this more educated, not easily ruffled northern people the Bolshevist propaganda 
did not reap many positive results.”13 
Csekey blamed liberal Estonian policies for not bringing special measures 
against the communists, who even had their own parliamentary party for quite 
some time. He summarized the most significant moments of the communist attempt 
to overthrow the state thus: “Once it became apparent that the leaders working at 
the orders of the Third International’s Estonian branch could not exert widespread 
influence on Estonia’s society, they aimed to achieve their goals via a government 
overthrow. Roughly fifty trustworthy and amply armed comrades were joined by 
workers from Tallinn’s Russian harbor organization to form a force of nearly three 
hundred supporters. On the morning of December 1, 1924, this force attacked  
a few governmental and military institutions located in the capital. While this 
assault was totally unexpected, troops from Estonia’s regular army and the police 
soon restored order. Half of the rebels were arrested while the rest fled to Russia. 
As to what little effect this putsch had on the “working people,” this is best 
                                                          
13 Csekey, I. Észtország története a világháború után, 38; Csekey, I. Észtország állammá alakulásának 
története és államrendje, 17. 
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shown by the fact that factories remained open and production continued as usual 
on this day.”14 
In Professor Csekey’s estimation, the leaders of this putsch arrived from the 
Soviet Union, where they – as émigré communists – mainly proved incapable of 
gaining the right kind of position for themselves. Since the Third International 
could not provide them with any kind of role in Leningrad, they had the choice  
of filling modest positions in Siberia or returning to Estonia to lay down the 
groundwork for a revolution. At the end of November, they crossed the border at 
Narva bearing false passports, Soviet money and Soviet military plans. The Third 
International had sent its secret agents into Estonia so telegrams requesting aid 
from the Third International could be sent once strategically placed locations 
throughout the capital had been occupied. On the day preceding the putsch, the 
number of secret telegrams exchanged between Moscow and the Soviet embassy 
in Tallinn was uncommonly intense, albeit this activity was taken at the time to 
be in an effort to consolidate good relations with Tallinn. In Csekey’s opinion, the 
Third International had been preparing for years to spark a socialist revolution 
from within Estonia, if at all possible, at which time the Soviet Union could rush 
to help. Due to Estonia’s geopolitical significance, it was of utmost importance 
that revolution first break out in Estonia, from where it could then spread to the 
two, other Baltic states, thereby inducing the collapse of all the border nations 
found in the buffer zone. Csekey emphasized that, other than this, Soviet politics 
were primarily aiming to destroy Poland.15 
In an article published in the Budapesti Hírlap, Csekey expressed the need for 
Estonia’s officials to show no mercy toward communist activites, in light of the 
nation’s present situation. He also mentioned movements by the Soviet Union’s 
Baltic fleet stationed in Kronstadt, at the ready to offer its “assistance”, as well  
as the presence of journalists who had arrived in Tallinn bearing a pre-printed 
proclamation for the purpose of announcing all that was to occur. According to 
Csekey, these preparations should be cause for alarm in Europe. 
This article16 also marks the first time Csekey expressed his analysis regarding 
the relationship between the Baltic states and the Soviet Union. As he stated, the 
Baltic states were in the most difficult position regarding the Soviet Union, an 
enormous nation possessing an inevitably significant economic influence on 
the Baltics. The Soviet Union’s only route toward gaining access to the sea was 
through the Baltic state; should the Soviets be dissatisfied with the behaviour of 
these nations – whether they were cooperating or not – the Soviet Union was 
still fully capable of dealing either an economic or a political death blow to the 
Baltics. The Baltic states could count on Great Britain alone: “Russia’s Bolsheviks 
are brilliantly trained in tactics. No other state or political system exists that 
                                                          
14 Csekey, I. Észtország története a világháború után, 29; Csekey, I. Észtország állammá alakulásának 
története és államrendje, 18. 
15 Csekey, I. Az észtországi kommunista puccskísérlet. – Magyarság, 12.12.1924. 
16 Csekey, I. A Baltikum és a szovjet, 2. 
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possesses – thanks to its intelligence service – such incredible bearings in foreign 
affairs. No one can compete with Moscow’s leaders in producing effective 
propaganda abroad. They thereby always center their attack on the point of least 
opposition… Estonia represents the most vulnerable of Baltic states due to its 
geographic, economic and political circumstances.”17 
In his analysis, Csekey also referred to the relatively small geographic 
distance between Tallinn and Leningrad, rendering it possible for the Soviet fleet 
to approach the Estonian coast very quickly from Kronstadt. He additionally 
emphasized Estonia’s economic dependence on the Soviet Union: not only were 
its raw resources imported from the Soviet Union, in times of peace Russia had 
also represented the largest market for Baltic goods. The Baltic states’ industry 
therefore supplied the Soviet Union and had been structured to suit this role. 
According to Csekey, the economic depression benefited the Bolsheviks politically, 
but he also mentioned how – among all the other concerns – Estonia’s defenses 
had been chipped away at by dissension and the inability to rally its own forces. 
This later aspect resembled Hungary’s and was a reflection of what Csekey 
referred to as the turáni átok [Turan curse]. He closed his analysis with the 
following remarks: “And if today’s generation awaits in vain the fall of Russian 
Bolshevism, the East’s dance with death can hardly end any other way than by 
the collapse of the great Russian empire. This tendency not only reveals the way 
in which the Baltic states have formed, but also indicates – perhaps even more  
so – the map of today’s Soviet Union, which is far more colorful than that drawn 
in Paris regarding Europe’s other regions.”18 
A few years later, Csekey wrote the following comments about Estonia: 
“Those witnessing the events here cannot warn the rest of the world strongly 
enough that the time has come to examine the issues simmering under Bolshevism’s 
lid from a far different perspective compared to what was customary during the 
past few years if we do not want to face a series of highly unpleasant surprises.”19 
 
 
CONNECTIONS  BETWEEN  DAILY  POLITICS  AND  PROCESSES   
IN  WORLD  HISTORY 
 
Following his return to Hungary in 1931, Csekey held an inaugural address on 
the topic of the Soviet Union at the University of Szeged. To provide one thought 
characterizing his speech: “If, however, the world should Bolshevize, I would not 
view this as an example of the Soviet Union’s success, but rather point to the 
short-sightedness and petty, nationalistic jealousy and selfishness of today’s 
capitalist leaders whose behavior has led to the terrible and virtually cataclysmic 
                                                          
17 Csekey, I. Az Észt Köztársaság alkotmánya és a Baltikum világpolitikai helyzete, 15–16. 
18 Ibid., 16–17. 
19 Csekey, I. Hólepte orosz mezőkön… – In: Északi írások. Pfeifer Ferdinánd (Zeidler testvérek) 
Nemzeti Könyvkereskedése, Budapest, 1928, 18. 
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moral crisis the only outcome of which can be the economic depression we 
face today.”20 
It can be stated in conclusion that the broader ramifications of daily, political 
events occurring in his time did not escape István Csekey’s attention. Possessing 
an excellent grasp of the power struggle, main conflicts of interest and the sheer 
hopelessness that characterized the situation experienced by these small Baltic 
states possessing no allies. Csekey in fact accurately described Estonia and 
Finland’s exact international position at the time of the outbreak of World War II. 
At least parts of Csekey’s analysis have furthermore withstood the test of time. 
While this present examination has not been able to deal in-depth with his 
writings from the end of the 1930s and the beginning of the 1940s, it must be 
mentioned that Csekey did in fact draw attention to that his predictions came true. 
István Csekey prognosticated how events would possibly play out while also 
outlining the paths nations would be forced to take in the interest of national 
security. Thanks to his professional knowledge, level of education and sense of 
dedication, István Csekey’s examinations of Estonia’s geopolitical situation can 
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EESTI  GEOPOLIITILINE  OLUKORD   




Professor István Csekey (1889–1963) oli kahe maailmasõja vahelisel ajal 
Ungaris väljapaistev isiksus Ungari ja Euroopa õigusteaduse ning Ungari-Eesti 
suhete alal. Tartu külalisprofessorina (1923–1931) edendas ta Ungari riigi ja ungari 
kultuuri tutvustamist, Ungaris aga populariseeris Eestit. Käesolevas artiklis on 
otsitud vastust küsimusele, millisena nägi üks haritud Euroopa kogemusega õigus-
teadlane Eesti ja selle naaberriikide geopoliitilist olukorda ning rahvusvahelisi 
suhteid 1920. aastail ja 1930. aastate algul. See lühike ülevaade on katkend pikemast 
kirjutisest, mis analüüsib Csekey Eesti ajaloost kirjutatud töid. 
Seoses Eesti riigi kujunemisega rõhutas professor juba 1924. aastal, et Eesti 
Vabariiki ei loonud mitte imperialistlikud ja ekspansionistlikud pürgimused, vaid 
rahva visa tahe, kuigi oma sünni eest ollakse tänu võlgu I maailmasõja tulemusele 
                                                          
20 Csekey, I. A szovjet államszemlélete. (Széphalom-Könyvtár, 25.) Szeged Városi Nyomda és 
Könyvkiadó Részvénytársaság, Szeged, 1932, 7. 
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ning antandile. Ta oli arvamusel, et Nõukogude Liidu hoiak Balti riikide suhtes 
sõltus Inglise-Vene suhte kujunemisest, kuna Balti riigid olid põhimõtteliselt 
Inglise mõju all. 
Csekey nimetas Soomet ja Eestit Venemaa serval kõige põhjapoolsemateks – 
Läänemere-äärseteks – ääreriikideks. Ta pidas Balti riike selliseks Lääne- ja 
Ida-Euroopa vaheliseks üleminekualaks, mis isoleerib Venemaa merest ning mille 
põhjapoolsem osa kujutab endast protestantlike Saksa mõjude tõttu Kesk-Euroopa 
vaimse kultuuri ääreala. Baltikumi idapiir langeb kokku selle piirivööndiga, mida 
mööda jõudsid viikingid (varjaagid) Soome lahest Aasovi mereni. See vöönd 
eraldas venelasi teistest Euroopa rahvastest ja seal jooksis piir ida- ja läänekiriku 
ning slaavi ja ladina kirjakultuuri vahel. Eesti iseseisvumise järel lahutasid Narva 
jõgi ja Peipsi järv uuesti ida ning läänt nagu Eesti alade vallutamise järel 13. sajandi 
algusest alates. Põhimõtteliselt selle piirini tungis ka Poola kuningas Stefan Batory 
16. sajandi lõpul. 
Just seepärast võis Csekey arvates Baltikum 18. sajandi algusest olla Venemaa 
aken, millest vaadati Lääne-Euroopasse. Kuna sakslaste sissevool (nagu sõnastas 
Csekey) oli kestnud juba seitsesada aastat, hõivates maavaldusi, kaubanduse ja 
vaimse elu suunamise, oli see muuhulgas ka seepärast toona impeeriumi harituim 
piirkond. Tsaarivalitsuse viimastel aastakümnetel aga valitses tsaari õukonnas prak-
tiliselt baltisaksa aadel. 
Põhja-Euroopa kultuuriala liikmeks sai Eesti Rootsi riigi osana, mis oli tuntav 
peamiselt seoses administratiiv-tehniliste ja haridusküsimustega. Rootsi püüdis 
1920. aastail Eestit ja kunagisi Rootsi suurriiki kuulunud riike silmatorkava polii-
tilise mõju laiendamise asemel oma huvisfääri tuua majanduse ning kultuuri 
vallas. Csekey arvates sõltus selle rootsimeelse kultuurikogukonna saatus sellest, 
kuivõrd õnnestus selle liikmetel, aga eriti Eestil ja Soomel, takistada slavismi 
ning bolševismi sissetungi idast. Eesti jaoks pidas ta oluliseks ka Poola toetuse 
saavutamist. Csekey oleks pidanud põhjendatuks ka ühise Soome-Eesti riigi loo-
mist, kuid vähemalt ühise välispoliitilise, sõjalise ja rahandusjuhtkonna loomist. 
1924. aasta putšikatsega seoses kirjutas ta, et bolševistlik propaganda ei and-
nud rahuliku meelelaadiga ja haritud põhjamaise rahva hulgas kuigi positiivseid 
tulemusi. Csekey heitis liberaalsele Eesti poliitikale ette, et võimud ei rakendanud 
kommunistide suhtes erilisi meetmeid. Põnevas analüüsis jõuab ta järeldusele, et 
Nõukogude Liit oleks just Eestis tahtnud valla päästa “revolutsiooni”, mis oleks 
kahte teise Balti riiki levides põhjustanud ääreriikide kokkukukkumise. Eestit 
nimetas ta Balti riikidest kõige haavatavamaks geograafilistel, majanduslikel ja 
poliitilistel põhjustel. Ta juhtis tähelepanu Tallinna ja Leningradi geograafilisest 
lähedusest tingitud ohtudele ning sellele, et Kroonlinna Nõukogude laevastik võib 
kiiresti Eesti rannikule suunduda, kuid märkis ka Eesti majanduslikku kaitsetust. 
István Csekey pööras tähelepanu ka päevapoliitilistele sündmustele ja seostele. 
Tema harituse ja terava pilgu kõrval teevad tema 1920.–1930. aastail kirjutatud 
analüüsid huvitavaks taustateadmised ajaloost ning kultuurist: ta tunnetas hästi 
jõujooni ja peamisi huvide konflikte samamoodi kui liitlasteta eksistentsi perspek-
tiivitust väikestele riikidele. 
